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Neither  neoclassical  nor Keynesian  economics displays much patience  with 
the popular  notion  that technical progress  of the labor-saving  variety  tends 
to swell the ranks of the unemployed.  Those who believe  that market  forces 
tend automatically  to bring  the economy back,  if not to "full employment,"  at 
least to a fairly sticky  "natural rate of unemployment"  seem inclined  to 
believe  that this process will wipe out any joblessness  created by  technical 
change, presumably  with  some modest  delay. The Keynesian  approach  suggests 
(subject to some recent  concessions  to the notion of the natural  rate of 
unemployment)  that the level of employment  can be adjusted by macroeconomic 
policy  and that this is capable  of undoing whatever joblessness  labor-saving 
innovation may engender. 
We will argue here  that there is more substance  to the public's  fears 
that new productive  techniques  can threaten jobs than is acknowledged  by these 
lines of analysis.  We will  suggest that when technical progress  is a 
continuing  process  a speedup  of change can have two profound  employment 
effects.  First,  it can increase, perhaps materially,  what used  to be referred 
to as "frictional  unemployment,"  thereby raising the natural  rate of 
unemployment  commensurately.  Second, because  of the sunk-cost  attribute  of the 
retraining  of workers  to enable  them to use the constantly-emerging  novel -L- 
techniques,  speedup  of technical  change, rather than even-handedly  leading  to 
brief periods  of unemployment  to all of the workers  affected,  tends to single 
out three classes  of workers,  the ill-educated,  the older former jobholders 
and women,  particularly  of childbearing  age, either  for declining  relative 
wages  or for protracted  and possibly  for lifetime unemployment. 
There  is, of course,  a considerable  body of writings  on the social  costs 
of economic  growth. By and large it has emphasized  the externalities  generated 
by  the growth process--crowding,  damage to the environment,  psychological 
tension,  alienation  and the like. It will be suggested here  that the 
employment  costs are arguably  of at least comparable  significance  and that 
they must be taken into account more explicitly  in any evaluation  of a program 
dedicated  to acceleration  of economic growth. 
We begin here with a brief  discussion  indicating how the sunk-cost 
outlays  required  for effective  retraining  can lead to longer average duration 
of unemployment  when  the pace of technical change  increases.  This discussion 
will be extended  and somewhat  formalized  in section 4 of the article.  But 
before  that, we will  review  the data for the U.S. and other  industrial 
countries  showing,  in particular,  the trends in the length of joblessness. 
Third, we will  digress  to recapitulate  the evidence on the human  cost  of 
protracted  unemployment.  It simply  is not true that unemployment  of one person 
for five years  is in any sense the equivalent of unemployment  of ten persons, 
each for six months.  There  is evidence, which  seems to be unfamiliar  to many 
economists,  indicating  that there is a high cost of lengthy unemployment  in 
terms of divorce, mental  illness, suicide, violence  in the home and a variety 
of other  forms that go well beyond  the mere  loss of income that results  from 
joblessness.  Finally, we will provide an econometric  investigation  of the 
influence  of technological  change upon the duration of unemployment. -3- 
1. SPEED  OF !L’EcHBIGAL  GEAl!iGB  AND  TEE  NATURAL  RA!l’E  OF UNEMPLOYMEElT 
First,  let us consider briefly how increased  technical  change  can lead to 
long-term  elevation  of the natural rate of unemployment.  The term "natural 
rate" presumably  refers  to the level of unemployment,  given  flexibility  of 
wages,  toward which  market  forces will automatically  move  the economy.  It is 
an unemployment  rate below which public policy  can drive the economy, but only 
in the short run and, even then, presumably  at some cost  in terms of 
inflationary  pressure  and other types of damage to the economy.  Thus, the 
natural  rate encompasses,  among other varieties,  the type of joblessness 
referred  to as "frictional  unemployment." 
Frictional  unemployment  includes the job loss that results when a plant 
or a firm or an industry  closes down because  of a change  in the terms of 
comparative  advantage,  technological  obsolescence,  and so on.  Particularly 
during  a period when Keynesian  involuntary unemployment  is negligible,  the 
scenario  associated  with  frictional unemployment  of the types just described 
is that the jobless  workers  will require some brief period,  perhaps  a matter 
of weeks  or months,  before  they can locate a new position. 
In any event,  it is easy to see that speed of technical  progress will 
affect  the magnitude  of the rate of frictional unemployment.  For this purpose 
we need merely  recognize  that technical progress  is not a one-shot  affair but 
is, rather,  since at least the middle  of the nineteenth  century,  a nearly- 
continuous  process,  with  technology and products  constantly  undergoing 
modification  and replacement.  Now suppose, for clarity of exposition,  that 
frictional  unemployment  is composed &  of two elements:  that attributable  to 
worker  relocation,  and that ascribable  to closing of business  units  (plants, firms or industries).  Assume  that the rate of worker  relocation  is fixed, and 
compare  two imaginary  and otherwise  identical economies:  stationary  economy  S, 
in which  there  is absolutely  no technical change and economy T,  in which 
change  is constant  and rapid.  It is clear that in the latter we can expect  far 
more openings  and closings  of business  units than in stationary  economy,  S. 
The opening  of new business  units  in T is, of course, what keeps  the jobs lost 
from any particular  plant closing  from becoming more  than a temporary  affair. 
Nevertheless,  it remains  true that frictional unemployment  will be permanently 
and, very plausibly,  substantially  higher  in T than in S, because  the 
continuous  flow of technical  change means that job losses will  also occur 
frequently,  if not continuously.  No sooner will one set of technologically 
unemployed  find new jobs  than they will be replaced by a new group of jobless, 
thrown out of work by  the succeeding  set of plant closings. 
Two conclusions  follow. First,  that the constant creation  and loss of 
jobs, even  if the two occur at identical rates, do not simply balance  out. The 
process  stirs up job change  and that takes time, contributing  a net increase 
in frictional  unemployment.  We will see presently  that even where  there is a 
once-and-for-all  change  of this sort, it is apt to have enduring  if not 
permanent  detrimental  effects.  These seem inadequately  taken  into account  in 
discussions  of trade policy  issues, as when reduction  of barriers  to trade 
between  the United  States and Mexico  is judged  to be favorable  to one or the 
other of the countries  if the number  of jobs the process  is expected  to create 
even only marginally  exceeds  the size of the anticipated  job loss. It simply 
is not true that a gain of 5,000 jobs constitutes  full compensation  for the 
loss of an equal number  of positions. 
Second,  it should be clear that the more rapid an economy's  rate of 
continuous  technical  change,  ceteris naribus,  the greater  its level of -5- 
frictional unemployment  and, hence,  the higher  its natural  rate of 
unemployment  will be. This  follows directly  from the argument  that has just 
been offered,  comparing  the stationary  economy with one undergoing  continuing 
technological  change.  For the more rapid the rate of introduction  of new 
techniques  and new products  the larger the number of plant  openings  and 
closings  and other  similar  events  that can be expected. Thus,  the natural  rate 
of unemployment  is surely  a monotonically  increasing function  of the economy's 
rate of technological  progress.  Here,  it is important to keep  in mind  that 
because  technical  change  is continuous,  a speedup in its rate will  raise the 
rate of frictional  unemployment  permanently,  in effect  increasing  for the 
indefinite  future  the amount of transitory joblessness  to be found in the 
economy. 
2. TRENDS  IN TEE DDRATION  OF lJNEMPW~ 
The available  data  indicate  that, at least in the United  States,  the 
length of time during which  a typical jobless person has spent  "between jobs" 
has increased  substantially  and fairly steadily throughout  the period  since 
the Second World War.  Figure  la summarizes  the most pertinent  data provided  by 
the Bureau  of Labor  Statistics  (see Table 1 for data sources and methods).  It 
indicates  that over the 45 year period  from 1948 through 1993 the average 
duration  of the period  of unemployment  has more than doubled,  and that the 
share of the unemployed  composed  of persons unemployed  27 weeks  or more,  that 
is, unemployed  more  than half  a year  (the longest period  covered  in the 
available  data) has  almost  exactly quadrupled. As the graph shows,  this 
trajectory  is characterized  by fluctuations  of considerable  magnitude. 
Nevertheless,  using  the conservative  calculation based  on a regression  of the -6- 
natural  logs of the data, we obtain a growth rate of nearly  1 percent 
compounded  for average  duration  of unemployment,  an annual growth  rate of 1.7 
percent  in the proportion  of the unemployed  who were jobless  27 weeks  or more, 
and an annual  growth  rate of 1.1 percent  in the proportion  unemployed  15 weeks 
or more  (see Figure  lb). In nearly half a century  this has, as we have  seen, 
brought  a substantial  addition  to the average duration  of unemployment,  and 
the proportion  of those who suffer unemployment  that is clearly protracted.  By 
1993, the share of the unemployed  who 
had exceeded  20 percent  of the total. 
As already  noted,  the problem  of 
were jobless  for more  than six months 
protracted  joblessness  is an 
international  phenomenon.  This  is illustrated by the 1994 OECD data for 10 
industrial  countries  reported  in Figure 2a. These show, for each country,  the 
percent  of unemployed  workers  who had been jobless  for a year  or more. We see 
that the U.S., with  its 12 percent  figure, had the lowest  incidence  of long- 
term unemployment.  Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands  had the unenviable 
position  of being  at the top, with more than half of their jobless  having  been 
out of work  for a year or more. These countries  also have overall unemployment 
rates significantly  higher  than the U.S. 
Figure  2b compares  the percentage  growth in long-term unemployment  for 
the same 10 countries  between  1975 and 1994. (While this graph  is primarily 
concerned  with  growth, we have put in the levels for 1975 and 1994 for 
reference.)  Once again,  the U.S., with its 130 percent  increase over  the 19- 
year period,  is near  the bottom  of the group. It is outstripped  by Germany, 
with  its 320 percent  rise, and by Canada, France, the United  Kingdom  and 
Sweden, where  long-term  unemployment  as a share of total unemployment  rose by 
approximately  250, 245, 210, and 145 percent,  respectively.  Clearly,  this is 
no minor phenomenon,  and the U.S.  is not its most badly damaged victim. -7- 
3. DICRESSIOB:  TEE SOCIAL  COST OF PROTRACTED  JOBLESSHESS 
It is at least arguable  that much of the economic  literature  pays 
insufficient  attention  to the true social costs of unemployment,  at least when 
the unemployment  suffered by the individual  is of long duration.  Reading 
between  the lines of discussions  of the (possible) tradeoff between  inflation 
and unemployment  one comes away with the impression  that a one-percent  rise in 
the economy's  inflation  rate is perhaps  about equally damaging  to the public 
interest  as a one-percent  rise in the rate of unemp1oyment.l  It will be argued 
here  that there is a rich and well-documented  body of materials  in the 
literature  of sociology  and social psychology  that makes  such an evaluation 
very difficult  to accept. Though much of that literature makes  little 
distinction  between  lengthy and brief unemployment  it is reasonably  plausible 
that a short spell of unemployment  causes little lasting psychic  or social 
damage.  It is only when  the unemployment  goes on and on, and the worker  begins 
even to suspect  that he or she will never hold a job again,  that suicide 
rates,  stability  of marriages,  mental  illness rates and other forms of 
damaging behavior  begin  to be affected  significantly. 
The main point  is that the true cost of long-lasting  unemployment 
probably  goes well beyond  the resulting  loss of output for the economy  and the 
corresponding  decrease  in the incomes of those who have lost their jobs.  Thus, 
for example,  Mallinckrodt  and Fretz  [1988] offer the following  summary  of the 
evidence: 
The devastating  impact of job loss on physical  and mental health  has 
been  summarized  in several reviews of empirical  investigations  (Dooley 
and Catalano,  1980; Gordus, Jarley,  and Ferman,  1981). Job loss has 
been  linked  to increased rates of suicide  (Hammermesh and Soss, 1974; -8- 
Pierce,  1967);  diagnosed  cases of mental  illnesses;  or increases  in 
both  inpatient  and outpatient use of mental health  services  (Barling 
and Handal,  1980; Brenner,  1973; Frank,  1981), increased  alcohol  abuse 
(Pearlin and Radabaugh,  1976; Smart, 1979), more external  locus of 
control  (Parnes and King, 1977), lowered self-esteem  (Perfetti and 
Bingham,  1983),  and severe depression  (Landau, Neal, Meisner,  and 
Prudic,  1980).  Some unemployed workers,  depending  on their 
attributional  style,  respond to the uncontrollable  aversive  event of 
job  loss with  learned helplessness  behaviors,  namely,  depression  and a 
lowered  self-concept,  that can immobilize job seeking  efforts  (Cohn, 
1978; Feather  and Davenport,  1981)  (p. 281). 
In addition,  there  is good reason to believe  that unemployment  is 
associated  with  crime and stimulates  the growth of the underground  economy 
more generally.  It probably  stimulates drug addiction  as well  as alcoholism. 
Yet one must  treat this inference with some caution because,  it must be 
admitted  that the empirical  evidence  is spotty and not always  consistent.  For 
example,  difficult  though  it may be to believe,  the statistics  seem to suggest 
that a general  rise  in unemployment  is associated with reductions  in violent 
youth crime,  though protracted  unemployment  do seem to be correlated  with 
increased  crime against property.  It seems that there have  in fact been  few 
studies of the subject  and that their results have not been  consistent. 
Research  on the relationship  between youth  crime and economic 
conditions  has  failed to produce  a clear set of findings.  Studies 
using both  cross-sectional  and time series age-specific  arrest  data 
from the Uniform  Crime Reports have found both  a positive 
relationship  (Allan and Steffnsmeier,  1989; Fleischer,  1963; 
Phillips  et. al., 1972; Smith et al., 1992) and a negative 
relationship  (Gibbs, 1966; Glaser  and Rice, 1959, Smith et. al., 
1992) between  crime and unemployment  among youth.  Singe11  (1967) 
used arrest  data from Detroit  (cross-sectional  and longitudinal)  and 
Danser  and Laub  (1981) looked at National  Crime Survey  data and 
found no significant  relationship  between unemployment  and criminal 
activity  among youth  [Britt, 1994, p. 102.1 
Similarly,  Britt's very  recent study of unemployment  and arrest  series 
data from 1958 to 1990 for persons aged 16 to 19 found that: -9- 
For violent  offenses  (homicide, rape and aggravated  assault)  as 
well  as for property  offenses  (robbery, burglary  and larceny), 
higher  rates of youth unemployment  are negatively  associated  with 
annual  changes  in the arrest rates of youth.  Conversely,  the lagged 
effect  of youth unemployment  is limited to property  offenses,  where 
annual  changes  in youth unemployment  are positively  related  to 
annual  changes  in the arrest rates of youth  for robbery,  burglary 
and larceny,  but negatively  related to changes  in the auto theft 
arrest  rate  [Britt, 1994, p. 99, italics in the original]. 
The data on some of the other consequences  of unemployment  have been 
explored more  thoroughly  and yield  implications  that are not quite so 
ambiguous  as those for crime. But some of the results are nevertheless 
surprising.  On the basis  of an extensive survey of the literature,  Warr  [1987] 
reports: 
Studies  at the individual level have mainly  been  cross- 
sectional,  but  longitudinal  investigations  are becoming  more common. 
Significant  effects of unemployment  have been recorded  for the three 
principal  axes of affective well-being,  and limited evidence  is 
available  in respect of competence,  autonomy,  and aspiration. 
Unemployment  is in general seen to impair mental health,  although 
this effect  is not universal;  indeed, a small minority  of people 
show gains  in mental health  after losing their job. 
Studies  at the aggregate  level have examined  changes  in 
communities  and nations  over a series of years. Aggregate  time- 
series  research  into the relationship between  unemployment  level and 
mental  hospital  admission  is generally  inconclusive.  Parallel 
studies  of mortality  rates have also yielded  results which vary 
between  investigators,  although a growing body of research  argues 
for a lagged  relationship  between unemployment  and aggregate 
mortality,  at lest in certain countries. 
A longitudinal  investigation of mortality  at the individual 
level has  suggested  a disproportionate  probability  of death  in the 
ten years  following  a period of unemployment.  Other  research has 
linked  suicide  to unemployment,  at least in cross-sectional  and 
aggregate  analyses.  Parasuicide  [attempted suicide] has been  found 
to be particularly  common among people unemployed  for long periods. 
In terms of health-related  behaviors,  it seems likely  that smoking 
increases  somewhat  after job loss, whereas  alcohol  consumption 
remains  on average unchanged.  However, previously  heavy  drinkers may 
increase  consumption  after they have become  unemployed. 
Research  has shown that family strain  is likely  to increase  as 
a result  of a husband's  unemployment,  but findings  in respect  of 
child neglect  and abuse are not yet clear. Divorce  and unemployment 
levels have been  found to be interrelated  in one aggregate  time- 
series  investigation  (Warr, 1987, pp. 207-g). -lO- 
Despite  the ambiguities  in the study results,  the conclusion  from all 
this is that the true public-welfare  costs of unemployment  are probably  much 
higher  than is generally  recognized  in the textbooks of economics,  and that 
the loss in GDP resulting  from a given rise in unemployment  constitutes  a 
grotesque  undervaluation  of the true magnitude  of the damage  it inflicts,  not 
only upon  those directly  affected but also upon the remainder  of the 
population  that must  then live with  the aggravated  social  ills and the heavy 
costs entailed  in the generally  ineffective means  that are routinely  used  to 
contain  them. 
All  this is dramatized  by the fact that a one percent  rise in 
unemployment  is associated  with,  roughly, a 2 percent  increase  in joblessness 
among youths  and an increase perhaps  twice as great as this in unemployment 
rates among young black  and Hispanic  persons.  It is magnified  in this 
exactly  those areas--the  slums of the inner cities, and the nation's 
Appalachias--where  the problems  of crime, addiction  and other equally 
problems  are already  at their most severe. 
way  in 
critical 
A second view  that seems to have widespread  currency  among economists  and 
in the press  is that a change  that destroys  5,000 jobs but creates  5,000 new 
jobs in their stead, while not quite neutral,  is not inherently  a matter  for 
great concern.  Here, we will  suggest that such a view also greatly 
underestimates  the resulting  social costs, particularly  if the result  is a 
marked  lengthening  of the period  of unemployment  for a substantial  proportion 
of those  immediately  affected.  That is, if all of those who obtain  the new 
jobs are persons  that would  otherwise have been unemployed  no more  than three 
months,  for example, but  the persons  thrown out of work  include a significant 
number who enter the ranks of the long-term unemployed,  the result  can hardly 
be considered  even roughly neutral. -11- 
4. NUMBER  OF UXJG-TERM  JOBLgSS AlQB  BAm  OF 'l!BCBBICAL  PBOGBBSS 
Apparently,  a disproportionate  share of the long-term unemployed  is made 
up of two groups  --older workers  whose place of employment moved  or closed  down 
or simply underwent  substantial  job trimming, and younger people  in depressed 
urban  and rural areas, particularly  members  of minority  groups with 
characteristically  low incomes, many of whom have never held anything but 
dead-end jobs or jobs  in the underground  economy. 
Though  reality  is always  too complex to be characterized  fully by any 
simple model,  there is a rudimentary  relationship  that can help  to account  for 
the distressing  phenomena  that have just been described.  For this purpose  let 
us examine  the decision  of an employer who is considering  whether  to offer a 
job to an unemployed  individual,  i. Let us assume  that technological  change 
means  that no person with  all of the requisite  skill and experience  for peak 
performance  on this job is available.  Then, to prepare  individual  i for the 
job some period  of training,  either on the job or separate  from it, will be 
required.  This will  constitute  a sunk outlay, Si(Ei,  p), which will vary with 
the individual's  previous  education  and experience,  summed up by  the variable 
E  i, and where  p is a variable  that will be discussed presently.  In return,  the 
employer will expect  a stream  of net profit  contributions  from the worker  for 
the t periods  that she can be expected  to remain at this firm. Assuming  for 
simplicity  (and with no loss of pertinent  generality)  that these are constant, 
we can write  them as Ri(Ei) - wi(Ei) per period, where Ri is the revenue 
contributed  per period  by i and wi is the wage payment  she receives.  Letting  r 
be the pertinent  interest rate  (including suitable compensation  for risk),  so 
that the present value  of this net payment  in period  s is (Ri - wi)/(l + r), -12- 
then by  the usual  formula,  the expected present value  of this stream of 
contributions  is (Ri - wi)[l -  vt"]/(l  - v), where 
(1) v - l/(1 + r) < 1. 
Thus,  the employer's  expected net gain from the employment  of i will be 
(2) 71i  =  [Ri(Ei) -w,(E,)][l - vt+l]/(l - v)  - S,(E,, p). 
Here, writing  Sri  for 8Si/aEi,  we may postulate for the pertinent 
derivatives 
(3) 'ri  < OP  Ri' > 0, wi' > 0 and Ri' - wi' > 0, 
that is, an increase  in the job seeker's education  reduces sunk training  cost, 
increases her marginal  revenue yield as well as her wages,  and increases her 
marginal  profit  contribution  per period.' 
Where  this is leading should now be fairly obvious.  First,  it is clear 
that if Si is large  in comparison with  the other terms in (2) then the entire 
expression  will be relatively  low, and may well be negative.  This clearly  can 
be a disadvantage  to the ill-educated, who will be driven either  to accept 
very  low wages,  or to suffer unemployment  until and if changing  conditions 
transform  (2) into a positive  number equal to that for a more educated 
individual,  j. If customs,  institutions  such as the minimum wage,  or the 
possibility  that only a wage below  the subsistence  level will make  (2) 
positive,  then unemployment  may be the only possible  fate for individual  i, 
and there  is no reason  inherent  in the construct  for this period  of 
unemployment  to be brief  or even impermanent.  Indeed,  it even possible  that S 
is so large for some unskilled  workers  that (2) will remain negative  even at a 
zero wage,  producing  a corner  solution entailing  lifetime unemployment  or 
employment  in the underground  economy, possibly  involving criminal  activity 
with attendant  personal  danger and low earnings. -13- 
The fact that, as noted  in (l), V < 1, clearly means  that  (2) is a 
monotonically  increasing  function of t, the time that the employer  can expect 
the new employee  to remain with  the firm. If the prospective  employee  is 
young,  though  subject  to considerable  uncertainty,  the employer  may consider 
it likely  that t will be large for that person. But with an older job 
candidate  the expected  value  of t is apt to be quite small, and very  likely 
smaller  than that for a younger  job candidate.  This means  that if i is an 
older person,  it is more  likely that ni in (2) will also be relatively  small, 
making  for lower wages  or unemployment,  just as in the case of the ill- 
educated job seeker.  Similarly,  if women, because  they are of child-bearing 
age or for any other  reason  (including prejudice)  are considered  less likely 
than men  to remain with  the firm for any considerable  period  or are considered 
a greater  risk  in that regard,  systematic downward pressure  on wages  or 
reduced employment  opportunities  may well result. 
At  this point  it is convenient  to turn our attention  to p, the variable 
which has  so far not been discussed.  This variable  is intended  to represent 
the rate of technological  progress,  and we may postulate  that 
(4)  SP > 0,  S Ep ’  ‘- 
That is, speeding  up of technical progress  serves to increase  the sunk cost 
entailed  in retraining,  other things being equal, and education  serves  to make 
the magnitude  of that cost increment more moderate.  This implies  immediately 
that increased  rapidity  of technical progress will enhance  the handicap  facing 
the uneducated,  the older job seekers and women.  It will make matters  more 
difficult  for those who are poorly educated because  the increase  in the cost 
of retraining  them to keep abreast of the newer techniques  grows the more 
rapid and the more  radical  the changes in those techniques.  The ill-educated -14- 
also suffer  from a rise in p since they can offer no offset  to the rise in 
their retraining  cost stemming  from increased rapidity  of technical  progress 
in the form of the negative  cross-partial  derivative  of S with  respect  to p 
and E. 
The obvious  effect  is increased unemployment  or increased  length  of 
unemployment  in those groups. There is also a second consequence.  This  is the 
effect on relative wages  of persons  in these groups  that do get jobs.  Given 
the level of employment,  as determined by the combined  influence  of the 
natural  rate of unemployment  and macro policy, as we have  seen, the demand  for 
older,  the female  and the less-educated  workers will  shift downward,  and that 
for the younger,  more-educated  male group will shift upward  as p increases. 
But, given  the supply  functions  of the four groups,  that will put downward 
pressure  on the wages  of the older, the female and the less-educated  workers 
and upward  pressure  on those of the remaining group. This will  add to the rate 
of financial  return  to investment  in education,  as has  indeed been happening 
in recent years.  In addition,  it will exacerbate  inequality  in income 
distribution,  raising  the earnings  of the younger and more educated,  at the 
expense of the poorly  educated  and of women workers,  with  the older group 
protected  in the real world  only through the exercise  of their considerable 
political  power,  a phenomenon  we must note even though  it is beyond  the scope 
of our argument  or our model. 
5. EMPIRICAL  INVESTIGATION 
A. Technological  Variables.  Our central hypothesis  is that the average 
duration  of unemployment  will  rise as the pace of technological  activity 
increases.  Five indices of technological  activity will be used  in this study. -15- 
The first is the rate of total factor productivity  (TFP) growth,  TFPGRTH, 
defined  as: 
(4)  TFPGRTH  = 2  - 2  - (1 - a>i2, 
where $ is the annual  rate of output growth, f.  is the annual  growth  in labor 
input, ? is the annual  growth  in capital input, and Q is the average wage 
share over the period.  This  is the standard measure of technical  change. 
The second  index of 
expenditures  to GDP. The 
scientists  and 
reasons why  it 
First, because 
engineers 
technological  activity is the ratio of R&D 
third is the number of full-time equivalent  (FTE) 
engaged  in R&D per 1,000 employees.  There are two 
is important  to consider such a second and third R&D measure. 
of its intangible nature, R&D activity  is inherently  difficult 
to measure.  Second,  industries may differ  in terms of the capital  intensity  of 
their R&D,  so that a manpower  measure  describes a different  side of 
technological  activity. 
The fourth measure  is investment  in new equipment and machinery  as a 
ratio to full-time  pquivalent  employees  (FTEE). This index is included  to 
allow for the possibility  that new technology may normally be embodied  in new 
capital  equipment  and machinery.  Standard measures  of TFP growth  do not 
adequately  capture  this effect. Because computers may play a particularly 
important  role as transmitters  of 
investment  in computers  (or, more 
accounting  equipment,  or OCA) per 
B. Institutional  Variables. 
new technology, we use as our fifth  index 
specifically,  office, computing,  and 
FTEE. 
Institutional  influences may also affect  the 
duration  of unemployment  and therefore must be controlled  for when performing 
the pertinent  econometric  analysis. We have singled out several  such -16- 
variables.  The first  is the actual unemployment  rate. As shown  in Figure  3, 
the duration  of unemployment  is quite cyclical  and appears  to be strongly 
correlated  with  the overall unemployment  rate. This is to be expected,  since 
the higher  the unemployment  rate, the lower the probability  of a jobless 
worker  obtaining  a  job and, ceteris oaribus,  the longer the spell of 
unemployment. 
The structure  of the unemployment  insurance  (UI) itself may also have  an 
important  effect  on the duration  of unemployment.  In particular,  by reducing 
the cost  to an individual  of being jobless,  the UI system may actually  prolong 
the duration  of unemployment  for many workers  (see, for example,  Feldstein, 
1974). The original  architects  of the UI system explicitly  recognized  this and 
argued,  in fact, that the added security  individuals had while unemployed 
would  enable  them to select a job more compatible with  their skills and 
interests.  Rather  than settling on the first position  offered,  an unemployed 
person  could continue his  (her) job search until a better match  and higher 
wages were provided.  This,  in turn, would prove 
better  job matches  should  increase the national 
in the allocation  of labor resources  (see Haber 
arguments). 
socially beneficial,  since 
output by  improving  efficiency 
and Murray  [1966] for related 
The type of unemployment  occasioned by the job search process  is called 
search unemployment,  which  is a form of frictional unemployment.  The UI  system 
reduces  the costs of remaining unemployed,  so the reservation  wage--the 
minimum  wage  a person  is willing  to accept--for  those searching  for a new job 
will be higher  on average  than without UI benefits.  As a result, we can expect 
an increase  in their average duration of unemployment.  The higher  the UI 
benefits,  the longer will be the average unemployment  spell. Most empirical -17- 
studies have  confirmed  a positive  relation between  the UI replacement  rate 
(the ratio between  the UI benefit  and the previous wage)  and the average 
duration  of unemployment.  Typically,  an increase in the replacement  rate of 
0.1 is associated  with  a half week to week  increase in the average  duration  of 
unemployment.  All  told, the UI system may cause covered workers  to remain 
unemployed  16 to 31 percent  longer than those not covered.3 
Two other  institutional  factors that may affect  the duration  of 
unemployment  are unions  and the minimum wage. We would  expect  that a high rate 
of unionization  will  increase  the duration of joblessness,  since  it will 
increase rigidities  in the labor market,  raise entry wages,  and thereby 
decrease  the probability  of employers hiring new workers.  A rise in the 
minimum  wage may be  expected  to have the same effect,  since  it will  truncate 
the distribution  of entry wages and reduce the likelihood  of employers  taking 
on new workers. 
C. Demographic  Influences.  One of the most notable  changes  in the 
postwar  period has  occurred  in the demographic  composition  of the labor force. 
In the U.S.  (and other OECD countries)  there has been  a rising  rate of labor 
force participation  of females and a decline  in the labor force participation 
rate of older men. As a result,  the gender composition  of the labor force has 
been  shifting  over time toward females and away from males,  particularly  older 
men. Because  the incidence  of unemployment  and labor force attachment  differs 
among different  demographic  groups  (unemployment rates have historically  been 
higher  for women  than men and for younger workers  than older ones),  it is 
possible  that these demographic  changes may partly  account  for the rise in 
unemployment  duration. 
D. Descriotive  Statistics.  Panel A of Table 2 and Figure 4 provide 
descriptive  statistics  on the relation between  average unemployment  duration -la- 
and technological  factors by period.4 These variables  are all based  on 
economy-wide  data, unless  otherwise  indicated. We have selected  five periods, 
which  roughly  correspond  to peaks  in the business  cycle  (low points  in the 
unemployment  rate),  since unemployment  duration  is closely  correlated  with  the 
unemployment  rate  (that is, both are counter-cyclical).  The mean  duration  of 
unemployment  remained  largely unchanged  over the 195Os, 196Os, and 197Os,  at 
about 11.5 weeks,  then jumped  to 14.6 weeks  in the 1980s and to 15.6 weeks  in 
the first half  of the 1990s. 
Of the five technology  variables,  the only one that is closely  correlated 
with duration  of unemployment  is OCA investment per FTEE. Though  it increased 
gradually  from $6  (in 1987 dollars) per FTEE in the 1950s to $21 per FTEE in 
the 197Os,  it jumped  to $185 per FTEE in the 1980s and then to $522 per FTEE 
in the 1990s.  In contrast,  the ratio of R&D expenditures  to GDP remained 
fairly constant  over the four and a half decades, except  for a fall-off  during 
the 1970s.  FTE scientists  and engineers engaged in R&D per 1,000 employees 
increased  at a rather  constant  rate from the 1950s to the mid-1990s,  rising 
more than 50 percent.  Likewise,  investment  in total machinery  and equipment 
per FTEE showed  a rather  constant  increase from the 1950s to the mid-1990s, 
more than doubling  over this time span. 
bY 
TFP growth  shows almost  exactly the opposite pattern  to the mean  duration 
of unemployment.  TFP growth was at its highest point  in the 1950s and 196Os, 
at 1.6 and 1.8 percent  per year, respectively, when unemployment  duration  was 
low. Annual  TFP growth  then fell to 0.7 percent during  the 197Os, 0.5 percent 
during  the 198Os,  and 0.3 percent  during the early 1990s. 
Panel B of Table  2 and Figure 5 provide descriptive  statistics  on the 
relation between  average unemployment  duration and institutional  factors by -19- 
period.5 We have  selected  two features of unemployment  insurance  (UI) programs 
that are often alleged  to affect  the duration of unemployment.  The first  is 
the replacement  rate. The higher  this ratio between UI benefit  and previous 
wage the longer we  should  expect unemployment  spells to last. The second  is 
the UI coverage  rate,  the percent  of all employees  covered by  the UI system. 
Here,  too, 
.  .  a posltrve  relation  should be observed between  duration  of 
unemployment  and the coverage  rate.  6 
Both  the UI coverage  rate and the UI replacement  rate have been  rising 
gradually  over  the postwar  period,  the former from 65 to 94 percent  of 
employment  and the latter  from 38 to 47 percent  of the average wage.  Both 
series are roughly  consistent  with  the general  rise in unemployment  duration, 
though neither  shows  a sharp break between  the 1970s and the 198Os,  as does 
unemployment  duration.  The unionization  rate, on the other hand, has been 
falling rather  steadily  since the 195Os, from 24 to 16 percent,  which  should 
have led to falling jobless  duration  rather than rising duration.  The minimum 
wage, after  increasing  between  the 1950s and 197Os,  from $3.60 per hour  (in 
1987 dollars)  to  $4.52,  fell to an average of $3.33 during  the 1990s. This 
trend, also,  should have  led to falling unemployment  duration  over the last 25 
years. 
Table  3 provides  a breakdown  of employment by gender  and age group  for 
the same five periods.  Between  1950 and 1993, females as a percent  of employed 
workers  increased  from 29 to 46, while men declined  from 71 to 54 percent. 
However,  the changes  were not uniform  over the various  age groups. Young  men 
(under age 25) fell from 8.8 percent  of total employment  in the 1950s  to 8.1 
percent  in the 1990s.  The share of men of prime working  ages  (25 to 54) in 
total employment  declined  from 46 to 39 percent. The biggest  change was  the -2o- 
decline  in the share of older men  (55 and over) in total employment,  from 13.3 
to 7.1 percent.  Among  female workers,  the only very substantial  change  is the 
share of females of prime working  age  in total employment,  which  surged  from 
20 percent  in the 1950s to 33 
a very  sharp  increase between 
increase  in mean unemployment 
Table 4 provides  another 
percent  in the 1990s. Moreover,  this share shows 
the 1970s and 198Os, coincident  with  the big 
duration. 
side of the issue by showing  the mean  duration 
of unemployment  by demographic  group.  We have used all the demographic 
details  on unemployment  duration published  by the Bureau  of Labor  Statistics.' 
The results  show that the rise in unemployment  duration between  the 1970s and 
1980s was almost universal  among demographic  groups, with  the average weeks  of 
unemployment  rising  in the order of 3 to 4 weeks.  However,  more  recently, 
between  the periods  1980-89  and 1990-93, the picture  is much more mixed,  with 
the average  duration  of unemployment 
others. 
rising for some groups but not for 
Another  striking  result  is that the average duration  of unemployment  is 
considerably  greater  for older workers  than younger  ones.  Among both men and 
women,  the average weeks  of unemployment  rose almost monotonically  with  age. 
Moreover,  between  1980-89  and 1990-93, unemployment  duration  increased  for 
older workers  (45 and over for men and 35 and older for women),  whereas  it 
declined  for younger  age groups.  Partly as a result of this, the spread  in 
unemployment  duration widened  between  older and younger workers  from the 1970s 
to the early  1990s.  The difference  in average time of unemployment  between 
men aged 16 to 19 and men aged 55 to 64 increased from 10.8 to 17.1 weeks:  the 
corresponding  change  for women was from 9.0 to 12.6 weeks. 
There  are also differences  in unemployment  duration  among gender  and 
racial  groups,  though  they are not as pronounced  as among age groups. -21- 
Unemployment  duration has been higher  for men than for women  and this has 
widened  over time, from 2.6 weeks  (13.1 less 10.5) in the 1970s to 3.9 weeks 
in the early  1990s.  The mean duration of unemployment  has also been  somewhat 
higher  for black workers  than white ones and has also increased modestly  over 
time.  The difference  in average duration between black  and white men rose 
from 1.4 weeks  in 1970-79  to 1.7 weeks  in 1990-93 and from 1.2 to 1.5 weeks 
between  black  and white women. 
Differences  by marital  status appear to be less interesting.  Single 
(never married)  persons have  experienced  lower average unemployment  duration 
than married  or previously  married  (widowed, divorced,  or separated)  persons, 
though  this may  to a large extent reflect the fact that singles  are, on 
average,  younger  than the latter group.  Mean unemployment  duration has been 
very similar  for currently  married  and previously  married men  though  it has 
tended to be  lower  for currently married women  than previously  married  ones. 
This latter result, however,  may simply reflect the greater  likelihood  that a 
married  woman will  drop out of the labor force after an extended period  of 
unemployment  than one who  is widowed,  divorced,  or separated. 
E. Regression  Analvsis.  We turn next to multivariate  regression  analysis 
to try to sort out the effects of technological,  institutional  and demographic 
variables  on changes  in unemployment  duration. We use two different  data 
samples  for the analysis:  (1) aggregate data for the U.S.,  covering  the 
period  1950-1995  and  (2) industry-level  data for the U.S.,  covering  8 major 
sectors and the period  1962-1993. The sectors are:  (1) agriculture;  (2) 
construction;  (3) durable manufacturing;  (4) non-durable  manufacturing;  (5) 
transportation  and public  utilities;  (6) wholesale  and retail  trade;  (7) 
finance,  insurance,  real estate, and service industries;  and  (8) public -22- 
administration.  The aggregation  scheme was dictated by the nature  of the 
available  unemployment  duration  data. Unfortunately,  statistics  on some of the 
variables  are not available  at the 8-sector  level. 
Our primary  dependent  variable  is the (natural) logarithm  of the average 
duration  of unemployment  There are statistical  problems  associated  with  the 
use of mean unemployment  duration as a dependent variable  in a regression.  The 
most  serious  is that the variable  is based  on a truncated  distribution,  since 
we can observe  individuals  only while  they are in the midst  of an unemployment 
spell.  In the Current  Population  Survey  (the source of these data), 
information  on the length of unemployment  is collected  only from individuals 
who are unemployed  at that time. As a result,  these individuals  have not 
completed  their unemployment  spells, so that the survey essentially  interrupts 
spells  that are still  in progress  (see Kiefer  [1988] for an extended 
discussion  of statistical  problems  associated with unemployment  duration 
data). To avoid  some of the pitfalls  that beset duration  data, most 
researchers  have used  the logarithm of duration  as the dependent variable  (see 
Devine  and Kiefer  [1991], Chapter  5). Alternative  dependent variables  are the 
percentage  of unemployed  workers  out of work 15 or more weeks  and the 
percentage  out of work  27 or more weeks. 
The first set of results, based on aggregate data, with  the natural 
logarithm  of the mean  duration  of unemployment  as the dependent variable,  are 
shown in Table  5. LNUIREPL,  the natural  logarithm of the UI replacement  rate, 
has the predicted  positive  effect on unemployment  duration.  The higher  the 
replacement  rate,  the longer unemployed  individuals  tend to search  for a new 
job and, consequently,  the higher  the average duration  of unemployment.  The 
coefficient  remains  statistically  significant  at the five-percent  significance -23- 
level in almost  all specifications.  However,  the UI coverage  rate  (the percent 
of workers  covered by the UI system) is positive,  as predicted,  but  is 
statistically  insignificant. 
The minimum  wage variable,  MINWAGE87, has a negative  coefficient  in all 
specifications  though  the variable  is not statistically  significant  in any. 
The interpretation  is that as the minimum wage falls in real terms,  entry 
wages  for new jobs will  also generally  fall. Workers with a given reservation 
wage will  thus have  an increasingly  difficult  time finding jobs with wage 
offers above  their reservation  wage.  a This interpretation  receives  additional 
support when  the natural  logarithm of the average weekly  earnings  of 
production  and non-supervisory  workers  in the total private  sector  (LNMNEARN) 
is substituted  for the minimum wage variable.  The coefficient  of LNMNEARN  is 
also negative,  though  it, too, is not statistically  significant  (results not 
shown). Similarly,  the unionization  rate has a negative  coefficient,  though, 
again, not statistically  significant  (results not shown). The interpretation 
is similar. A decline  in unionization  is associated with  falling wages,  which 
decreases  the chance  of unemployed  workers  finding a job with  a wage  about 
their reservation  wage. 
Of the five technology  variables,  the only that is statistically 
significant  is the annual  rate of TFP growth  (TFPGRTH). Indeed, TFPGRTH  is 
positive  in all specifications  and significant  at the one-percent  level. 
Moreover,  when  it is included  in the regression,  the coefficient  of LNUIREPL 
remains positive  and becomes  significant  at the one percent  level. The other 
four technology  variables-- (1) RDGDP:  the ratio of total industrial  R&D 
expenditures  (company and federal sources) to GDP in current  dollars;  (2) 
SCI&ENG:  full-time  equivalent  scientists and engineers  engaged  in R&D per -24- 
1,000 employees;  (3) OCAFTEE:  investment  in office, computing,  and accounting 
equipment  [1987 dollars]  per full-time equivalent employees;  and  (4) 
EQUIPFTEE:  investment  in total equipment and machinery  [1987 dollars]  per 
full-time  equivalent  employees-  -all have positive  coefficients  but have 
relatively  low t-statistics. 
One reason  that TFP growth may have such a strong positive  correlation 
with  the mean  duration  of unemployment  is that it exhibits  the same cyclical 
fluctuation  over time as unemployment  duration  (see Figure  6). In 
specifications  (4) and  (5), this problem  is controlled  for to some extent by 
the use of autoregressive  estimation  techniques.  In order to remove  some of 
the additional  cyclical  component  of unemployment  duration, we also regressed 
LNMEANDUR  on LNUIREPL,  TFPGRTH,  and the actual unemployment  rate.  In this case 
also, the coefficient  of TFPGRTH  remains positive and significant  at the one- 
percent  level  (results not shown). 
The demographic  variables  do have a significant effect  on unemployment 
duration. After  some experimentation,  we found that the best  fit is provided 
by the inclusion  of the following  three demographic variables:  (1) percent  of 
total employees  in age group 16-19;  (2) percent of total employees  in age 
group 20-24; and  (3) the percentage  of total employees who are men  in age 
group 25-54  (see specifications  6 and 7).  These three variables  are 
significant  at the one-percent  level in five cases and at the five-percent 
level in the sixth case. The percent of teenagers in total employment  has  a 
negative  coefficient,  most  likely reflecting  the transitory  nature  of teenage 
employment.  If they become  unemployed,  they are very  likely to drop out of the 
labor force. On the other hand,  the other two variables  each has a positive 
coefficient.  A plausible  reason  is that workers aged 20 to 24 and male workers -25- 
aged 25 to 54 will  tend to remain  in the labor force when  they become 
unemployed  and continue  to search for a new job.g 
The  "goodness  of fit" of all these regressions  is quite high, with R2- 
statistics  of 0.72 or above. The best fit is provided by specification  (7), 
which  includes LNUIREPL,  TFPGRTH,  and the three demographic  variables  as 
regressors. 
The same regressions  were also performed with  two other dependent 
variables:  (1) the percent  of unemployed  workers who are unemployed  for 15 or 
more weeks;  and  (2) the percent  of unemployed workers who are unemployed  for 
27 or more weeks.  The results,  shown in Table 6, are almost  identical  to those 
reported  in Table  5. 
Next, we repeated  the same analysis using our eight-sector  industry 
sample. All variables  were  available  for each of the eight sectors, with  the 
exception  of the UI coverage  rate, the UI replacement  rate, and the minimum 
wage.  For these variables,  we used the value  for the aggregate  economy. 
Moreover,  because  of the high degree of serial correlation  in our variables, 
each variable  was converted  into first-difference  form  (the difference  between 
the observation  in period  t and the observation  in period  t-l). 
The results,  shown in Table 7, generally confirm our previous  findings. 
The first difference  in the natural  logarithm of the (aggregate) UI 
replacement  rate has  a positive  coefficient,  which  is highly  significant.  The 
first difference  of industry-level  TFP growth is also positive  and highly 
significant.  In these regressions,  the coefficients  of the UI coverage  rate, 
the unionization  rate, and the minimum wage are all insignificant.  Similarly, 
the coefficients  of R&D intensity,  the number of scientists  and engineers  per 
employee,  and investment  in OCA as a ratio to FTEE are all generally  positive 
but  insignificant. -26- 
Data on the gender  and age composition  of industry employment  are 
available  only for the period  1976 to 1993. Of these variables,  the only one 
that is statistically  significant  is the percentage  of employees  in age group 
16-19, which,  as before,  has a negative  coefficient.  The failure of the other 
demographic  variables  to be significant may be attributable  to the short time 
period  covered by  these variables.  Dummy variables  for sectors were also 
included  in the regression  (with the exclusion  of manufacturing).  However, 
these variables  were  statistically  insignificant,  both  individually  and as a 
group. 
Table  8 shows the results of the last set of regressions,  in which we 
again use the aggregate  data but employ as the dependent variable  the mean 
duration  of unemployment  for individual age groups.  The results  support one 
of our major hypotheses,  that older age groups will be more adversely  affected 
by technological  change  than younger ones in terms of length of unemployment 
spells.  Among  men,  the coefficient  of TFP growth for age group 55-64 is 10.4 
__ more  than double  the value  of the coefficient  for any other age group,  and 
has  its smallest value,  2.6, for age group 16-19.  The coefficient  of TFP 
growth  ranges  from 3.8 to 4.8 among age groups 20-24 to 45-54.  Among women, 
the coefficient  of TFP growth  is again lowest for the youngest  age group  (16- 
19 years),  with  a value  of 2.46, and highest  for the oldest  age group  (55-64 
years of age), with  a value  of 4.91.  The coefficients  for the intermediate 
age groups  range  from 3.11 to 4.90.  The coefficient  of TFP growth  is 
significant  at the one percent  level in all specifications  except  two, where 
it is significant  at the five percent  level.  Among all men,  the coefficient 
of TFP growth  is 4.2 and among all women,  4.1, indicating  that a one 
percentage  point  increase  in TFP growth  is associated with about a 4 percent 
decline  in the average  duration  of unemployment. -27- 
Another  pertinent  result  is that the only other technological  or 
institutional  variable  that is statistically  significant  in these regressions 
is EQUIPFTE,  the average  annual  investment  in equipment  and machinery  (in 1987 
dollars) per FTEE.  Moreover,  this variable  is significant  only for the 
younger  age groups  and has a negative  coefficient  (results are shown for only 
those cases  in which  the variable  is significant).  This set of results 
suggests  that younger  age groups are favored by new technology  embodied  in new 
equipment.  An additional  investment of $1,000  (in 1987 dollars)  in machinery 
and equipment  per FTEE will  reduce the average spell of unemployment  among 
young workers  by  about 20 percent.l' 
6. COl!NXJDIlUG  REMARKS:  ON TEE REAL COSTS OF UNEMPUNI4ENT 
The duration  of unemployment  has risen rather dramatically  over the last 
half century.  The mean duration  of unemployment  has approximately  doubled 
between  the early  1950s and the mid-1990s, with most of the increase occurring 
since the early  1970s. The percentage  of unemployed workers  out of work  15 or 
more weeks more  than doubled over the same period, while  the percentage  of the 
unemployed  out of work  27 or more weeks  tripled.  We also found that the rise 
in unemployment  duration between  the 1970s and the early 1990s was almost 
universal  among demographic  groups, with the average weeks  of unemployment 
rising  generally  about  3 to 4 weeks. 
Another  striking  finding  is that average weeks  of unemployment  rise 
almost monotonically  with age.  Moreover, between  the 1970s and early 199Os, 
the spread  in unemployment  duration widened  sharply between  older and younger 
male workers  -- from 10.8 to 17.1 weeks between  teenagers  and those aged 55 to 
64. -28- 
Our econometric  results  are generally consistent with  the central  thesis 
of our paper,  that the duration  of unemployment  increases when  the rate of 
technological  change  rises.  Moreover,  the results support a second hypothesis 
that technological  change will more adversely affect older  than younger 
workers  in terms of duration  of unemployment.  TFP growth bore  a much  stronger 
positive  relation  to length of unemployment  among older men  than younger  men 
and a somewhat  stronger  relation  among older than younger women.  Moreover, 
duration  of unemployment  is negatively  related to investment  in new machinery 
and equipment  per FTEE but  this effect  is significant  only for younger 
workers.  These  results  are consistent with the argument  that firms are 
reluctant  to invest  in the new training associated with new technology  for 
older workers  because  of the shorter pay-off period  or, perhaps,  because  of 
the greater  difficulty  of retraining  older workers  ("you can't teach an old 
dog new tricks"). 
We  also found,  like other researchers,  that the UI replacement  rate has a 
strong  (positive)  influence  on the duration of unemployment.  Demographic 
variables  also have  a strong  influence on the duration of unemployment.  In 
particular,  the proportion  of total employment  in age group  16-19 is 
negatively  related  to unemployment  duration, while  the proportion  in age group 
20-24 and the share of total employment  consisting  of men  in age group 25-54 
have a positive  bearing. 
Somewhat  paradoxically,  the sharp increase in unemployment  duration 
observed  over the last 20 years or so was not found to be attributable  to an 
acceleration  in the pace of technological  change, since TFP growth has  slowed 
down since the 1960s. Rather,  an increase in the UI replacement  rate appears 
to be the most  important  influence. However,  this should not be  interpreted  to -29- 
mean that UI benefits  have been steadily  increasing  in real terms.  In fact, 
they rose by 44 percent  in constant dollars  from 1950 to 1983 but have  since 
been virtually  unchanged.  Rather,  the increase in the replacement  rate seems 
rather  to have  resulted  primarily  from a fall in average weekly  earnings, 
which  declined  by  21 percent  in real terms between  1973 and 1995. 
Demographic  changes  in the composition  of employment  also appear  to have 
contributed  to the rising  duration of unemployment.  Teenagers  as a proportion 
of total employment  fell from about 6 percent  in the early 1950s to 4 l/2 
percent  in the mid-1990s.  Since this share is negatively  related  to 
unemployment  duration,  the relative decline  in teenage share of jobs would 
serve to increase  the average duration  of unemployment.  The same effect  is 
produced  by  the decline  in the share of older workers  (age 55 and over)  in 
total employment  from approximately  17 percent  in the early 1950s to 12 
percent  in the mid-1990s.  In contrast,  the rise in the 
20-25 as a  share of total employment,  from 9 to 10 l/2 
1950s to the mid 199Os,  served  to increase the average 
share of workers  aged 
percent  from the early 
unemployment  duration. 
The only countervailing  influence  is that of the decline  in the share of 
prime-age  male workers  (age group 25 to 54), from 47 to 40 percent  over this 
period, which  should have helped  to reduce mean unemployment  duration. -3o- 
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1  We recognize  that it is dangerous  and probably unfair  to characterize  in 
such broad  and general  terms a vast  literature produced by a very  large number 
of writers  with  greatly  different  political views.  There are, undoubtedly 
exceptions,  and we are confident  that many of our colleagues will not dissent 
markedly  from the conclusions  on the true costs of unemployment  that follow. 
Nevertheless,  even  if the preceding  sentences  in the text do exaggerate 
matters,  it seems to us that a dispassionate  evaluation will  concede  that we 
are not far off the mark. 
2  These  relationships  are similar to some posited by Gary Becker  in his model 
of on-the-job  training,  in his Human Capital. 
3  See Marsten  (1975), Ehrenberg  and Oaxaca  (1976), Hammermesh  (1977), Welch 
(1977), Classen  (1979), Solon  (1979), Barron and Mellow  (1981), Moffitt  and 
Nicholson  (1982), Feldstein  and Poterba  (1984), Meyer  (1990), Katz and Meyer 
(1990), and Devine  and Kiefer,  1991, Chapter 5, for a fairly complete  review 
of the literature. 
4  Some of the variables  in Figure 4 are resealed  to fit on the Y-axis. 
5  Some of the variables  in Figure  5 are also resealed to fit on the Y-axis. 
6  A third parameter  of the system, the maximum number  of weeks  of UI 
benefits,  varies  too little over the postwar period  (39 weeks  in some deep -36- 
recession  years  and 26 weeks  in all others) to be of much  interest here. 
'  Unfortunately,  for the purposes  of this analysis, unemployment  duration by 
educational  group  is not available. 
s  The results  are almost  identical when the natural  logarithm  of the minimum 
wage  in 1987 dollars  is used  instead of MINWAGE87  in the regression. 
'  In contrast,  the coefficients  of the percentage  of workers  aged 55 and over 
and the percent  of workers  who are women  in age group 25 to 54 are all 
negative  but  statistically  insignificant.  The results do suggest  that these 
groups  tend to drop out of the labor force when they lose their job. 
lo  Regressions  run by gender and race group do not show very  sizable 
differences  in results.  The coefficient  of TFP growth,  for example, varies 
from 3.7 for black  females  to 3.9 for black males,  4.0 for white  females,  and 
4.3 for white  males.  Differences  in results among marital  groups are also not 
very  substantial. -37- 
Table 1 
Variable  Definitions  and Data Sources and Methods 
1.  Mean  duration  of unemployment  and the percent  of unemployed  workers  who 
are unemployed  for 27 weeks  or more or 15 weeks or more.  Source:  Council  of 
Economic Advisers,  Economic  Report  of the President,  1996,  (United States 
Government  Printing  Office, Washington,  DC: 1996). Table B-40, page  326.  The 
data were  originally  tabulated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
Mean  duration  of unemployment  by demographic  group is computed  from: 
Bureau  of Labor  Statistics,  Employment  and Earnings,  (Washington,  DC: United 
States Government  Printing  Office), various years. 
2.  The civilian  unemployment  rate.  Source:  Council of Economic Advisers, 
Economic  Report  of  the President,  1996, OD.  tit, Table B-38, p. 324.  The data 
were originally  tabulated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
3.  R&D expenditures  include company,  federal, and other sources.  Source: 
National  Science  Foundation,  Research  and Development  in Industry,  (Arlington, 
VA:  National  Science  Foundation),  various years. 
4.  Full-time  equivalent  (FTE) scientists and engineers  engaged  in R&D. 
Source:  National  Science Foundation, Research  and Development  in Industry, 
(Arlington, VA:  National  Science Foundation),  various years. 
5.  Gross non-residential  fixed capital.,  Sources:  John C. Musgrave,  "Fixed 
Reproducible  Tangible  Wealth  in the United  States:  Revised  Estimates,"  Survey 
of Current Business,  Vol.  71, No. 1, January,  1992, pp. 106-137;  "Fixed 
Reproducible  Tangible  Wealth  in the United  States," Survey  of Current 
Business,  Vol.  74, No. 8, August,  1994, p. 56. 
6.  Full-time  equivalent  employees  (FTEE).  Sources:  U.S. Bureau  of Economic 
Analysis,  National  Income and Product diskettes,  1959-88; U.S. Bureau  of 
Economic Analysis,  National  Income and Product Accounts  of  the United  States: 
Vol. 2, 19.59-88,  (Washington,  DC:  U.S. Government  Printing Office),  September 
1992; Survey  of Current Business,  Vol. 71, No. 4, January,  1992, p. 66; and 
Survey of Current  Business,  Vol. 76, No. l/2, January/February  1995, p. 76. 
7.  Gross Domestic  Product  (current and 1992 dollars).  Source:  Council  of 
Economic Advisers,  Economic  Report  of the President,  1996, on. tit, Tables  B- 
1, B-2, and B-9. 
8. Investment  in office,  computing,  and accounting  equipment  [1987 dollars] 
and investment  in total equipment  and machinery.  Source:  U.S. Bureau  of 
Economic Analysis,  Diskette  of Detailed  Investment by Industry.  (Received 
January  1996). 
9.  Employees  covered  by Unemployment  Insurance.  Sources:  Council  of 
Economic Advisers,  Economic  Report  of the President,  1996, Table B-41, page 
327; Council  of Economic Advisers,  Economic Report  of the President,  1984, 
Table B-36, p. 262.  Employment  is for age 16 and over. -3a- 
11. Average  weekly  UI benefit  check.  Sources:  Council of Economic  Advisers, 
Economic  Report  of  the President,  1996, Table B-41, page  327; Council  of 
Economic Advisers,  Economic  Report  of the President,  1984, Table B-36, p. 262. 
12.  Average  weekly  earnings  of production  and non-supervisory  workers,  total 
private  sector.  Sources:  Council of Economic Advisers,  Economic  Report  of 
the President,  1996, Table B-43, page 330; Council of Economic Advisers, 
Economic  Report  of  the President,  1984, Table B-39, p. 265. 
13.  Minimum  wage.  Source:  U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical  Abstract 
of the United:  1995  (115th edition), Washington,  DC, 1995, Table  681, p. 436. 
14.  Consumer  Price  Index.  Source:  Council of Economic Advisers,  Economic 
Report  of the President,  1996, Table B-56, page 343. 
15.  Percent  of labor force covered by unions.  Source:  Bureau  of Labor 
Statistics worksheets.  Estimates  for 1983-1995 are annual  averages  from the 
Current  Population  Survey.  Estimates  for 1950-83 are the annual  average 
number  of dues paying  members  reported by labor unions.  Data exclude  numbers 
of professional  and public  employee  associations. 
16.  Employment  by gender  and age.  Sources:  1950-1974.  U.S. Bureau  of Labor 
Statistics,  Handbook  of Labor Statistics,  (United States Government  Printing 
Office, Washington,  DC: 19S5), Bulletin  2217, Table 15. 1975-1993.  US Bureau 
of Labor  Statistics,  Employment  and Earnings,  (United States Government 
Printing  Office, Washington,  DC: 1977-94). January  issues, various  years. 
Figures are based  on annual  averages  for household  data. -39- 
Table  2 
Mean Unemployment  Duration  and Mean Values  of Technological 
And  Institutional  Variables  by Perioda 
A. TechnoloPical  Variables 
FTE  Annual 
Mean  Ratio  of  Sci. & Eng.  Rate 
Duration  of  R&D Expend- Engaged  in  OCA  Equipment  of TFP 
Unemployment  itures to  R&D per 1000  Investment  Investment  Growth 
Period  (Weeks)  GDP  [%]  Employees  per FTEEb  per FTEEb  [%I" 
1950-60  11.4  1.95  4.01  0.006  1.96  1.56 
1960-69  11.7  1.97  4.81  0.007  2.54  1.75 
1969-79  11.5  1.56  4.32  0.021  3.46  0.65 
1979-89  14.6  1.83  5.47  0.185  3.80  0.47 
1989-95  15.6  1.93  6.43  0.522  4.35  0.29 
B. Institutional  Variables 
Mean  Percent  of  UI  Members  Minimum 
Duration  of  Employees  "Replace-  as Percent  Wage 
Unemployment  Covered by  ment Rate"  of Labor  in 1987 
(Weeks)  UI  [%ld  Force  Dollars 
1950-60  11.4  64.9  38.4  24.4  3.59 
1960-69  11.7  73.2  40.1  22.6  4.46 
1969-79  11.5  82.6  41.6  21.1  4.52 
1979-89  14.6  92.6  43.5  18.0  3.73 
1989-95  15.6  93.9  47.2  16.0  3.33 
a.  See Table  1 for variable  definitions  and sources and methods. 
b.  In thousands  of 1987 dollars per employee.  Private sector  only. 
C.  Uses  FTEE and gross non-residential  capital  stock, for the private  sector 
only. 
d.  The UI  "replacement  rate"  is computed  as ratio of average weekly  UI 
benefits  to average weekly  earnings,  total private nonagricultural  employees. -4o- 
Table 3 
Mean Unemployment  Duration  and the Percentage  Distribution 
of Total Employment by Gender and Age and by Perioda 
Mean  Percentage  Distribution  of Total Employment 
Duration 
of Unem-  Male  Female 
ployment 
(Weeks)  16-19  20-24  25-54  55+  16-19  20-24  25-54  55+  Total 
1950-60  11.4  3.4  5.4  46.4  13.3  2.6  3.8  20.3  4.8  100.0 
1960-69  11.7  3.9  6.2  42.7  12.2  3.0  4.4  21.4  6.1  100.0 
1969-79  11.5  4.5  7.4  38.6  10.3  3.7  6.1  23.3  6.0  100.0 
1979-89  14.6  3.4  6.9  37.8  8.1  3.1  6.1  28.9  5.6  100.0 
1989-95  15.6  2.6  5.5  39.2  7.1  2.4  5.0  32.7  5.4  100.0 
a.  See Table  1 for variable  definitions  and sources and methods. -41- 
Table 4 
Mean  Duration  of Unemployment  by Demographic  Groupa 
(Period Averages) 
1970-79  1980-89  1990-93 
Men 
All Men 
16 to 19 years 
20 to 24 years 
25 to 34 years 
35 to 44 years 
45 to 54 years 
55 to 64 years 
65 years  and over 
Women 
All Women 
16 to 19 years 
20 to 24 years 
25 to 34 years 
35 to 44 years 
45 to 54 years 
55 to 64 years 
65 years  and over 
White,  16 years  and 
Men 
Women 
Black,  16 years  and 
Men 
Women 
13.1  17.1  17.2 
8.3  9.3  8.5 
11.6  14.5  12.6 
14.0  18.3  17.0 
16.8  21.1  20.3 
18.0  22.7  24.1 
19.1  23.8  25.6 
21.0  19.3  24.5 
10.5  12.4  13.3 
7.5  7.8  7.5 
9.5  10.8  9.5 
10.8  12.9  13.2 
12.1  14.7  16.0 
13.9  16.1  18.1 
16.5  17.8  20.1 
18.2  15.6  19.6 
over  11.7  14.4  15.2 
12.8  16.6  16.9 
10.2  11.6  12.9 
over  12.8  17.0  16.6 
14.2  19.3  18.6 
11.4  14.6  14.4 
Men,  16 years  and over: 
Married,  spouse present 
Widowed,  divorced,  or separated 




Women,  16 years  and over: 
Married,  spouse present 
Widowed,  divorced,  or separated 
















a.  See Table  1 for variable  definitions  and sources and methods. -42- 
Table 5 
Regressions  of the Mean Duration of Unemployment  (MEANDUR) 
On Institutional,  Technological,  and Demographic  Factors= 
Specification 
Independent 
Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Constant  -1.99 
(0.98) 
-1.89  -1.12  -8.29""  -7.30**  -11.06* 
(0.82)  (0.53)  (3.58)  (3.09)  (2.10) 
-16.09** 
(4.07) 




1.12*  2.88**  2.70**  1.89" 
(2.06)  (4.68)  (4.38)  (2.33) 
3.12** 
(4.87) 
UICOVER  002 
42) 




TFPGRTH  4.34**  4.04** 
(5.27)  (4.92) 
4.  29*‘k 
(5.63) 












R2  0.73  0.72  0.75  0.83  0.83  0.76  0.88 
Adj. R2  0.71  0.69  0.72  0.81  0.81  0.73  0.86 
Std. Err.  0.131  0.134  0.127  0.102  0.102  0.122  0.089 
DW stat.  1.86  1.84  1.90  1.81  1.85  1.83  1.83 
No of Obs  44  43  43  42  42  43  43 
Est. Tech. AR(2) 
PI:  1.03"" 
P2: -0.41** 
M(2)  AR(Z)  M(2)  M(2)  AR(l) 
1.04""  1.03**  1.03**  1.06**  0.67*"' 
-0.42**  -0.43**  -0.25  -0.29 
a. Dependent  variable  is LNMEANDUR:  the natural  logarithm  of the mean 
duration  of unemployment.  t-ratios  (absolute values)  are shown  in parentheses 
below  the coefficient.  The sample  is based on aggregate  data for the U.S 
economy.  Key: 
LNUIREPL:  Natural  logarithm  (LN) of the UI  "replacement  rate",  defined  as 
ratio of the average weekly UI benefit check to the average weekly 
the -43- 
earnings  of production  and non-supervisory  workers,  total private  sector 
[percent]. 
UICOVER:  The ratio of the number  of employees covered by Unemployment 
Insurance  to total civilian  employment  [percent]. 
MINWAGE87:  The minimum wage  deflated by the Consumer Price Index  (1987 = 
100). 
TFPGRTH:  Average  annual percentage  rate of total factor productivity  growth 
[see equation  41. 
%EMP1619:  percent  of total employees  in age group 16-19. 
%EMP2024:  percent  of total employees  in age group 20-24. 
%MAL2554:  the percentage  of total employees who are men  in age group 25 
AR:  Autoregressive  process.  (1) First-order:  ut = 6t  + pl.u,_i 
(2) Second-order:  ut =  Et  + Pl.U,-i  + Pz'Ut-2'  where ut is the error 
of the original  equation  and ct is a stochastic  term assumed  to be 
identically  and independently  distributed. 
See Table  1 for data sources and methods. 
*  Significant  at the five percent  level  (2-tail test). 
**  Significant  at the one percent  level  (2-tail test). 
54. 
term -44- 
Table  6 
Regressions  of the Percent  of Unemployed  Workers Who are Unemployed  for 
15 or More Weeks  or 27 or More Weeks 
On Institutional,  Technological,  and Demographic  Factors= 
Dependent Variable 
Independent 
Variables  %UNEMPL15  %UNEMPL27  %UNEMPLlS  %UNEMPL27 




































R2  0.77  0.81  0.85  0.86 
Adj. R2  0.76  0.79  0.83  0.84 
Std. Err.  3.30  2.14  2.76  1.89 
DW stat.  1.85  1.68  2.06  1.86 
No of Obs  43  43  43  43 
Est. Tech. 
PI: 
AR(l)  AR(l)  AR(l)  AR(l) 
0.86**  0.79**  0.63**  0.61** 
a. t-ratios  (absolute values)  are shown in parentheses  below  the coefficient. 
The sample  is based  on aggregate  data for the U.S. economy.  Key  (also see 
footnotes  to Table  5): 
%UNEMPL15:  Percent  of unemployed  workers who are unemployed  for 15 or more 
weeks. 
%UNEMPL27:  Percent  of unemployed  workers who are unemployed  for 27 or more 
weeks. 
*  Significant  at the five percent  level  (2-tail test). 
**  Significant  at the one percent  level  (2-tail test). -45- 
Table 7 
Regressions  of the Duration  of Unemployment:  _ 
Results  Based on Eight-Sector 
Dependent Variable 
Independent 
Variables  DLNMEANDUR  DUNEMPL15  DUNEMPL27 
Constant  0.02  -0.24  -0.04 
(1.69)  (0.77)  (0.87) 
DLNUIREPL  2.05**  94.5**  46.7** 
(4.47)  (7.24)  (4.51) 
DTFPGRTH  0.91"  15.6**  22.4** 
(4.01)  (3.80)  (4.19) 
R2  0.15  0.20  0.12 
Adj. R2  0.15  0.20  0.12 
Std. Err.  0.152  4.78  3.79 
DW stat.  1.81  1.92  1.97 
No of Obs  184  248  248 
Est. Tech.  OLS  OLS  OLS 
Simpiea 
a. t-ratios  (absolute values)  are shown in parentheses  below  the coefficient. 
The sample  is based  on data for eight sectors of the U.S. economy:  (1) 
agriculture;  (2) construction;  (3) durable manufacturing;  (4) non-durable 
manufacturing;  (5) transportation  and public utilities;  (6) wholesale  and 
retail  trade;  (7) finance,  insurance, real estate, and service  industries;  and 
(8) public  administration.  Key: 
DLNMEANDUR:  First difference  of the natural  logarithm of the mean duration  of 
unemployment. 
DUNEMPL15:  First difference  of the percent  of unemployed  workers who are 
unemployed  for 15 or more weeks. 
DUNEMPL27:  First  difference  of the percent of unemployed  workers who are 
unemployed  for 27 or more weeks. 
DLNUIREPL:  First  difference  of the natural  logarithm  (LN) of the UI 
"replacement  rate".  [This variable  is available  only for the total 
economy.] 
DTFPGRTH:  First difference  of the average annual percentage  rate of total 
factor productivity  growth  [see equation 41. 
*  Significant  at the five percent  level (2-tail test). 
**  Significant  at the one percent  level  (2-tail test). -46- 
Table 8 
Regressions  of the Mean Duration  of Unemployment  by Age Group 
On Institutional  and Technological  Factorsa 
Independent  Variables  No. 
Demographic  Ad'. 
Rz' 
Std.  DW  of 
Group  Constant  LNUIREPL  TFPGRTH  EQUIPFTE  R2  Err. Stat  Obs 
Men by age zLrouo: 
16-19 years  -6.2% 
(2.02) 
16-19 years  -1.76 
(0.55) 
20-24 years  -6.65# 
(1.95) 
20-24 years  -2.47 
(0.73) 
25-34 years  -6.99* 
(2.22) 
35-44 years  -0.31 
(0.11) 
45-54 years  -5.11* 
(2.27) 
55-64 years  -4.43 
(1.32) 
Women by  age prouo: 
16-19 years  -5.00 
(1.70) 
16-19 years  -0.17 
(0.07) 
20-24 years  -6.43* 
(2.16) 
20-24 years  -2.11 
(0.67) 
25-34 years  -8.58* 
(2.82) 
25-34 years  -5.02 
(1.74) 
35-44 years  -4.19 
(1.44) 
45-54 years  -7.85* 
(2.31) 



























(3.64)  (5.43) 


























(3.05)  (5.99) 
1.81*  3.83** 
(2.35)  (3.38) 
2.81**  4.04** 
(3.11)  (4.01) 
0.96  4.91** 
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